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Regulation theory has gained a lot of credits for conceptualising the present crisis of capita-
lism that followed the "golden age" of the two post-war decades (Dunford 1994). Although 
it starred analysing fordism at a time, when it already was in crisis, regulation theory has 
concentrated on studying phases of institutionally stabilised accumulation, like fordisrn 
(Aglietta 1979, Boyer 1986). Soon, analysts claimed that the stable phase of fordism was 
substituted by a new mode of development, flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel 1984). As 
time passed by, it became clear that this supposed new stability did not materialise. Neither 
Piore and Sabel's global keynesianism nor neoliberalism were able to end the capitalist crisis 
of growth and productivity. evertheless the conceptual framework of regulation theory was 
attractive enough to start a discussion about the relationship between the new and the old, 
between fordism and its - unknown - successor (Amin and Robins 1990, Benko and Dunford 
1991, Jessop, 1992, Lipietz 1991, Lovering 1990, Sayer 1989). 
Our paper, therefore, has conceptual and empirical objectives. Empirically, we want to make 
a first collection of relevant studies on Viennese economic and political development and 
integrate it within the conceptual framework of regulation theory. Unfortunately, in Austria 
little work that is based on a regulationist framework has been done on Austrian political-
economic development. Worse, however, is the situation for its capital city, Vienna. Contrary 
to other central cities of german-speaking Europe - Frankfurt and Zurich (Hitz et al. 1995) -
there are as far as we know only few empirical contributions of regulation theory (f.e. Banik-
Schweitzer, 1996). 
Theoretically, we are more ambitious as we will use a historicaJ-geographical approach. 
Historically, most analysts concentrate on analysing the last decades, by this limiting analysis 
to the periods of fordism and its transition to postfordism, forgetting to look at the more 
remote past. Until recently, even within regulation theory economists and political scientists 
continued to neglect sub-national developments. Within geography interest was much 
concentrated on regionalised modes of development within the "industrial district" framework 
(Storper and Scott, 1992, Garofoli 1992). As far as urban studies are concerned, however, 
studies with a regulationist approach have been an exception (Goodwin et al., 1993, Keil 
1993, Hitz et al., 1995). In our analysis we want to study the historical and geographical 
layers (Massey 1984) to get a better understanding of the decisive forces of development and 
their relationships. 
Following Fiori (1995), we will look at the interrelationship between accumulation 
strategi~ and centralisation/decentralisation of the state and the ensuing strategie! of 
the local government. On the one hand, accumulation strategies impact on the relationship 
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between economic space and political territory as well as on the regional homogenity/-
heterogenity of the national social formation which influence the range of choices in regard 
to the centralisation/decentralisation of the state and the strategies of different territorial 
levels of the state. On the other hand, state strategies influence accumulation strategies. 
A first glance at the modem history of Austria shows that there were at least four relevant 
periods which resulted in two relatively stable and two relatively instable modes of 
regulation. The unsuccessful tendencies towards centralization in Habsburgian Empire were 
followed by a fragmentation in small politically independent, but economically disintegrated 
nation states and the world-wide known experiment of local socialism, "Red Vienna". 
Fascism itself will not be treated as a proper period, although its long-lasting economic and 
political repercussions are obvious. The defeat of fascism led to a more successful form of 
nation building and national centralisation after the war. In the last years national regulation, 
as is well documented, entered in crisis in Austria too, due to processes of globalisation and 
fragmentation. In the following, we will try to analyse these developments in more detail. 
1. Habsburg Empire: centralised non-national territory 
1.1. Extensive accumulation and a weak bourgeoisie 
The economy of the late 19th and early 20th century of the Habsburg Empire was charac-
terised by an extensive regime of accumulation. The capital goods industry and the 
consumer goods industry were not closely interlinked. A considerable part of consumer goods 
were still produced under at best semi-capitalist conditions. Large parts of the population 
were engaged in petty commodity production. Therefore, a mass market for consumer goods 
did not exist. Wages were regarded as a cost factor only, not as a demand factor. In so far, 
the general traits of the accumulation regime showed unambiguous similarities with many 
other states in Western and Central Europe. There were, however, some remarkable differen-
ces as well. 
In Habsburg Empire, the capital goods sector was less developed than in states like Germany, 
France or Britain. The electrical engineering and chemical industries were controlled by 
German capital and were dependent on German technology. Consumer goods industries (esp. 
textiles and food) made up for a large part of industrial production (Gross 1985: 232 et seq.). 
The industries were concentrated in a few locations, mainly in the Western part of the 
Empire (today 's Austrian and Czech Republic). At the beginning, new, technologically 
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VIENNA National National Local Local 
regime of accumulation mode of 1·egulation regime of accumulation mode of regulation 
1867 - 1914 Extensive accumulation Persistent strong Influence of feudal Globally oriented - From a passive lo an acllvc blnle 
• late industrialisation Interests with a large hinterland • local reRulntion in synchrony with 
Dynamic Center • export oricntntion (townrds other parts of • liberal economic policies • increasing modernisation of industry nntionnl level the empire) • gold standard (strong PDI) • controlled chonge "from nhovc" of an Empire 
• nobility invested in agro-industry and trans• • competitive labour market • financial centcr of the Empire • "Municipal Socialism" with hm11cd 
port • incipient monopolist competition • specialisation in industries with com- political participation 
• lnrgc sector of pc11y-commodity production • llritish hegemony, with increasing Gcr- parative advantages for cities (quali fied • communnlisntion of infrastructure 
• restricted domestic market man challenge labour) 
1918 - 1938 Crisis of accumulation Orthodox stabilisation policies (under Globally oriented - Red Vienna •local soclallm1 
• hlocked accumulation conservative rule) without hinterland • counter-model 10 notion stoic 
Center • high export orientation (but diminished ex- • liberal state with increasing authoritori- • loss of traditional markets for industry • locnl welfnre state ond progrcsMve 
of a depleted tcrnal outlets an tendencies • global (empire-wide) outlook and accu- taxation 
• large sector of pelly-commodity production • gold standard mutation strategics of finance capital • no explicit economic pollcle& 
nation state • restricted domestic market • partially regulated labour market with • party dominance within civil 5ociety 
incipient wel fare stole followed hy destruction of opposition 
• incipient monopolist competition pnrties ond civil ~ociety 
• crisis of international regulation (austrofasclsm) 
1938 - 1945 wnr economy • fascist state • insignificant role in war economy • pohticol degradohon to o prov111c1ol 
• autonomous German currency capitol 
German • authoritarian regulation of labour mar- • totnl loss of locnl autonomy ket and forced labour 
Fascism 
• monopolist competition 
1945 - 1986 Intensive accumulation Supply-side Fordlsm National centcr (or a natlonally orlc- Locnl Fordlsrn 
• high growth rates • strong corporatism nted economy) • local execution of nat strategy 
Lagging • export oricntntion redirected to western • autonomous local currency • concentration on consumer goods-indu- • welfnre state as the delivery of social 
Europe • monopolist regulation of labour market stry for nat ional market services (esp. housing) 
national center 
• development of domestic mass market • monopolist competition • lagging behind growth rates • cstatisation of civil society 
• Brellon Woods system • US-hegemony • national financial center and national • controlled change "from above" 
ccnter of control 
1986 - 1996 Crisis of overaccumulallon Neollberallsm and continuing crisis Nationally oriented • Loss of national regulatory functions, 
• persistent low growth rates (under social-democratic rule) with weakened national market but without local strategy 
• incrensing importance of financial accu- • weakening corporatism • de-industrinlisation • local regulation in synchrony with In search of a 
mutation • eroding autonomy of local currency • diversified local production system national level 
regional 
• differentiation and weakening of domestic • slowly eroding monopolist regulation • national center of direct foreign invest- • dcfense of fordist regulatory mecha-
center status market of labour markets ment nisms (paternalistic welfare state, 
• monopol ist competition strong influence of Chamber of Com-
• crisis of international regulation and mcrcc) 
EU-membership • increasing fiscal constraints 
advanced industries requiring a highly skilled workforce were mainly located in large urban 
centres which could offer an appropriate work force, e.g. electrical engineering industry in 
Vienna. Due to the natural resource base, heavy industries were built up mainly in Bohemia 
which grew increasingly important in the industrial field from the late 19th century onwards. 
The consumer goods industries were geopraphically distributed in a more even way. Never-
theless, the Eastern, Hungarian part of the empire was, except for a few industrial centres, 
like Budapest and Kosice, largely rural and hardly industrialised. Its wealthy strata (the large 
Hungarian nobility and groups of the urban population) provided a ready market for Western 
industries. In so far, the Eastern Habsburg Empire was functionally close to an internal 
colony. It is, therefore, not surprising that the industries in Western Habsburg Empire showed 
little export orientation compared with Western European industries though there were 
exceptions like industries in Northern Bohemia geared towards the German market (Gross 
1985, Good 1986). 
Like in other Central European states, banks played an extremely important role in fostering 
industrialisation. They were involved in founding industrial companies and in their everyday 
financing. Through shareholdings and interlocking directorships the banks were intimately 
linked to industrial corporations. In contrast to Britain, France, and Germany, Habsburg 
Empire was not exporting monetary capital on a significant scale, since the banks found 
outlets within the heterogenous Empire and did not embark on deliberate strategies of 
commercial and financial penetration of foreign territories as the German banks did in close 
cooperation with industrial corporations. According to Platt (1984: 86), Austrian financial 
interests held about 90% of their "foreign" investment in Hungary and most of the rest in the 
Balkan area. 
Politically, the nobility continued to exercise a decisive influence (Banik-Schweitzer 1983: 
11 et seq.) and their alliances were different from other European countries. The Crown and 
central bureacracy and military, i.e. basically the (high) nobility, of the Empire were ambigu-
ous about establishing unfettered capitalist relations of production and rather sought to 
preserve some vestiges of the old order. They embarked on what might be called a strategy 
of controlled change. They shared an interest in preserving the multinational, economically 
and socially heterogenous Empire. These financially potent groups invested principally in 
industries related to agriculture and in transportation. It was difficult to obtain bank loans for 
investment in dynamic sectors, like electrical engineering and metal-working. These sectors 
were soon dominated by foreign firms. Some of the middle strata were much closer to a 
liberal economic agenda, but were national in outlook and thus threatening the unity of the 
Empire (Bruckmi.iller 1985: 446 et seq., Le Rider 1994). 
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Mirrowing this socio-political division, there were rwo intellecrual strands - a multinational 
strand and several national ones. It was not in the least to contain democratic and heterogene-
ous national movements that the Crown and its political allies sought to centralise political 
decision making. The central government in Vienna sought, however, the compromise with 
the Hungarian national movement which was increasingly divorced from the democratic 
movement In 1867, they agreed on an "Ausgleich" which gave the Hungarian half of the 
Empire a large degree of autonomy, even in the economic field. More or less underground 
national movements subsisted, however, in different parts of the Empire and aimed at 
achieving national and bourgeois emancipation. 
1.2. Vienna, a globally oriented, increasingly active world city 
Politically and financially, Vienna was the uncontested centre of the heterogeneous Empire. 
The Viennese financial bourgeoisie was part of the closely knit international high finance 
(Polanyi 1990). Its financial tentacles reached more or less to every important comer of the 
Habsburg Empire. Budapest and Prague were only secondary financial centres. Viennese 
banks were to a considerable extent able to shape the industrial development in Habsburg 
Empire. 
As an industrial location, Vienna was not so dominant in the Empire as in the financial 
field. Production of products in a later phase of their product cylce, like the textile industry 
with its high demands on space and its centralised production process (loom), began to leave 
Vienna as early as mid-19th century (MeiBl 1983: 116). They were substituted by new 
industries, especially mechanical engineering industry that began to boom due to the railways 
construction. The respective industry concentrated in Vienna due to the existing know-how 
but also because the railway-network of the Empire had its natural node in Vienna From the 
middle of the century onwards there can be observed an increase in the size of manufactu-
ring, especially in the industries related to the railway-sector: metal-working and machinery. 
In another sector, clothing, decentralised small-scale production was possible due to the 
invention of the sewing machine. Fashionable cloth with its short production cycles was 
produced in small sweat shops with a high female participation rate which enabled a low-cost 
production in a highly urbanised environment. In this new organisational setting of outsour-
cing production, small-scale-producers were economically subordinated to a few large firms. 
In the case of fashionable cloth, Vienna itself provided an important outlet, but in many other 
branches production was geared towards the whole Habsburg Empire. In general, small-scale 
production was more wide-spread than in many West European industrial centres or in 
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Prague (Melinz and Zimmermann 1996: 23 et seq.). 
State owned enterprises played an important role in the Viennese industrial structure, mainly 
in the military field that was concentrated in Vienna (MeiBl 1983: 120). At the end of the 
century, electrical engineering industry became a leading sector. It was concentrated in 
pre-war Vienna, consisting in large part of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Siemens, AEG, 
Brown Boveri). In 1890 and 1910 57% resp. 49% of all workers engaged in the electrical 
engineering sector in the Western part of the Habsburg Empire were employed in Vienna. 
The concentration ratios in the more established consumer goods industries were not that 
high (Banik-Schweitzer 1996: 39 et seq.). To sum up, it was mainly industries based on new 
technologies that had to rely on large agglomerations with their large pool of highly qualified 
labour and their research institutes. 
Politically, due to highly restrictive election laws (Lehnert 1996: 95 et seq.), the financial, 
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie was able to control city politics. At the end of the 
century, even liberal city administrators had to increase the role of the local state, building 
an aqueduct from the alps to Vienna. The financial base of the city, mainly indirect taxes on 
consumption and housing rents (Seliger 1996: 89) was propped up by subsidies of the central 
government because of the capital status. The formally independent petty-commodity-produ-
cers were increasingly used ideologically as the foundation of the Christian-Social party. As 
national industrial bourgeoisie remained weak, Vienna quite uniquely was governed already 
before the war by this non-liberal party. Lueger, Vienna's major from 1896-1911, based his 
local government on an alliance between the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the 
bourgeoisie. Out of the locational necessities of local industry, Lueger communalised public 
transportation and gas distribution, two crucial parts of the local infrastructure, as service 
delivery by private companies was very poor. Due to very high fees, revenues from commu-
nalised companies formed an important part of the city 's revenues. Furthermore, the city had 
to take up big loans to finance communalisation (Seliger 1996: 90). These policies allowed 
the modernisation of the Viennese industry and a catch-up with Western Europe. Self-
declared "Municipal Socialism" did not, however, change the social structure of the polarised 
city due to its unaltered budget policy. As at the national level it was a controlled change, 
executed from above. 
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2. Fragmentation of the centralised Empire (1918-1945) 
2.1. Crisis and orthodox stabilisation policies 
In Europe and the United States the inter-war years were characterised by a structural crisis, 
as the accumulation regime became incompatible with the mode of regulation. First in the 
USA, later in Europe, industrial mass-production was introduced (though to varying 
degrees). Mass production did, however, not find a mass market. Mass incomes were 
instable. Wages were downwardly flexible, social security systems still in its infancy. In 
Europe, large parts of the population were still engaged in petty commodity production, at 
times agriculture remained almost at subsistence levels. The state did not stabilise demand. 
Thus, industries tried to follow aggressive export strategies. These strategies were backed 
up by deflationary state policies attempting to cut wages, esp. in the 1930s ( cf. Mazier et al. 
1993). This ended in an internationally unregulated cut-throat competition. In states where the 
exhaustion of the old development model was most obvious, capital resorted increasingly to 
speculative financial investment, a phenomenon quite typical of structural crises (Arrighi 
1994). The structural crisis came into the open from the late 1920s onward. 
Inter-war Austria shared some of the structural features of the crisis and was quite vulnerable 
to crises in other countries. The Habsburg Crown's attempt to preempt the disintegration of 
the Empire by entering World War I ended in the dismembering of the Empire. The break-up 
of the Empire entailed grave consequences for the Austrian economy. The inherited, hardly 
modified regime of accumulation was built on capital and commodity exports from the 
Viennese core region to other parts of the Empire. The masked extraversion of the late 
Empire era was transformed into an open one. Both banking and industrial capital proved 
inept to adapt to the changed circumstances. The policies of the Austrian government did not 
help in the transition. 
The financial sector was shaken by the hyperinflation of the immediate post-war years. The 
austerity policies under the control of the League of Nations from 1922 onwards were laid 
out to prop up the financial sector and did bring down inflation. However, they did not stop 
the decline and permanent crisis of the banking sector. The Viennese banks which had 
partially been taken over by foreign capital tried to shore up their interests in the successor 
states. The governments, bankers, and industrialists of these states, however, sought to break 
lose from Viennese control. The Viennese banks' strategies geared towards the economic 
space of the former Habsburg Empire proved to be built on political illusions and turned out 
to be costly failures. The banks financed long-term commitments with short-term credits. 
8 
This was only a viable strategy as long as foreign lenders did have trust in the Austrian 
financial system and were able to lend to Austrian banks. Both ceased to be the case from 
the late 1920s onwards. On the one hand, Austria's financial system was deeply affected by 
the U.S. crisis, and, on the other hand, the collapse of the the largest Austrian bank with 
strong international links, Creditanstalt, in 1931 was a milestone in the deepening of the 
international financial crisis. Creditanstalt had run up losses to the tune of 10 per cent of 
Austria's GNP (Kernbauer et al. 1983, Weber 1995a). Thus, the rehabilitation of the banking 
sector in the early 1930s proved extremely costly and turned out to be very prejudicial to all 
other sectors of the Austrian economy (Stiefel 1988). 
The tight monetary policies entailing high interest rates and the restrictive budgetary policies 
favouring mainly financial capital and a few sections of the petty bourgeoisie and being 
pushed through politically with the decisive support of the League of Nations did not only 
fail to stem the financial crisis, but did actually sharpen the structural problems of the 
Austrian economy. Austria inherited a disarticulated, geographically very unbalanced industri-
al structure geared towards a much larger market of the former Empire. The successor states 
did follow protectionist policies, so that Austrian industry lost outlets in Eastern Central 
Europe. The share of successor states in Austria's merchandise exports declined from 58.6% 
in 1920 to 31.7.% in 1937 (Weber 1995a: 32, Tab. 6). Austrian industry was not highly 
competitive in other markets, and the high interest rates made modernisation an extremely 
costly undertaking. Thus, there was not much of an alternative to Eastern Central Europe for 
Austrian industrialists. The share of final industrial product in commodity exports declined 
from 83% in 1923 to 70% in 1932 signalling a "reprimitivisation" of foreign trade (ibid.: 32). 
Austria's industry was particularly hard hit by the protectionist policies in the 1930s since it 
did not have a large colonial sphere of influence to fall back on. These problems are reflected 
in an oscillating export quota ( defined here as merchandised exports to GNP) which was 
about 20% in the late 1920s, tumbled to 8% in 1932 and rose again to 12% in 1937 (Kern-
bauer 1995: 568). 
The domestic market did not prove to be an alternative either. Due to the extremely re-
strictive budgetary policies, investment of the central government was extremely low. The 
conservative governments, backed by foreign interests, did its best to undo the social con-
quests that the labour movement had won immediately after the war. It sought to reduce 
social security expenditure, actually following a pro-cyclical policy in this field. Especially 
in the 1930s, the conservative government attempted to reduce the real (and social) wages to 
enhance the international competitiveness (while maintaining a stable exchange rate). A 
considerable part of the population continued to be engaged in petty commodity production. 
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Due to the conserved social structure and the extremely restrictive budgetary policies, the 
domestic market remained quite restricted. 
Thus, Austrian industry encountered a structural crisis entailing a rather depressed production 
and high unemployment even in comparatively "good" years. Even by the not very rosy 
international standards of that time, Austrian macro-economic performance was very poor in 
the interwar years. From 1913-1929, the GNP growth rate amounted to 0.3 % in Austria 
compared to an average of 1.6% in the four successor states and 1.9% in Europe, in the 
period 1929-1937 Austrian GNP shrunk by 1.8% per year whereas from 1929 to 1938 the 
average growth rate in the four successor states was 0.4% and the European average was 
1.1 % (Marz 1995a: 29, Tab. 4, cf. Stiefel 1988, Kembauer et al. 1983, Weber 1995a). It is 
not surprising that under these circumstances the new Austrian nation state had severe 
legitimation problems. There were continuous discussions about linking up with Germany or 
forming a new Danubian Confederation. The former option was initially rather favoured by 
the labour movement wishing to see more rapid industrialisation, the latter by certain 
financial interests (Sandgruber 1995). The two options were, however, not mutually ex-
clusive. Both strategies implied the attempt to conserve the central function of Vienna: either 
directly through links by the way of trade policies with the Danubian states or, if these would 
resist politically, backed by the German Empire (Stiefel 1988: 336). The contradictory 
interests to German capital tended to be downplayed. There were, however, serious obstacles 
to both options. For a long time, the victorious powers prevented Austria by various means 
from effecting an "AnschluB" to Germany. On the other hand, the Danubian states were quite 
unwilling to return under the tutelage of Vienna (cf. e.g. Ra.sky 1995). 
2.2. "Red Vienna" and a local economy without hinterland 
The incessant discussion about "AnschluB" and Danubian Confederation were just one 
facette of the territorial question. Immediately after World War I, the historical "Lander" 
which embodied quite different socio-economic conditions reemerged demanding regional 
autonomy (and in the case of Vorarlberg and Tyrol even contemplating secession). In the 
end, the centralised bureaucracies of the old Empire prevailed allowing only for the in-
stitutionalisation of a rather mild version of federalism. The further conflicts about cen-
tralisation vs. decentralisation in the First Republic were deeply tainted by the conflict 
between the conservative central government and the socialdemocratic city and regional 
government of Vienna which was a "red island" in a "black sea". The right wing's attempts 
at re-centralisation were from the end of the 1920s increasingly linked to strategies of 
deparlamentarisation. In 1933/34, the Christian-Social government staged a creeping "autogol-
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pe" and established a centralised austrofascist regime (cf. Talos and Neugebauer 1988). 
In 1918, Vienna was the only metropolis within what was left of Austria. It lost, however, 
some of its status. It lost its macro-regional financial, industrial and political functions though 
it maintained these functions at the national level. The loss of its hinterland entailed a grave 
crisis in Vienna. Unemployment was high, population decreased from 2.120 mn in 1910 to 
1.92 rnn in 1923 (FaBmann 1995: 14). 
The crisis opened the way for new actors in local Viennese politics. With the introduction of 
universal franchise in the wake of democratic reformism of the immediate post-war era, the 
Social Democratic Workers Party (SDAP) was able to take over the city government signal-
ling a shift of local power. SDAP followed new policies which at least dampened the local 
economic crisis and improved living conditions considerably (Ohlinger 1993). At the core of 
socialdemocratic policies was an extremely ambitious housing programme. The city's 
large-scale investment in housing stimulated the local industry in the 1920s. Capital expendi-
ture of the Viennese local government was in many inter-war years higher than that of the 
central government. From 1924-28, capital expenditure of Vienna's local government 
amounted to ATS 817.2 rnn compared to ATS 738.2 rnn of the Federal Government (Weber 
1995b: 539, Tab. 3)! 
Socialdemocrats lacked, however, a consistent economic strategy, the positive effects on local 
industry being mainly the result of their social commitment. Their national strategy aimed at 
gradually moving towards socialism - "Austromarxism". As the national government was 
conservative, all intellectual and political efforts of the party and its social movement 
concentrated on the city. This allowed a surprising amount of innovative, world-wide praised 
strategies in such diverse fields as housing, school reform and social policy. "Red Vienna" 
was based on a very strong link between the party, civil society and the city administration. 
All aspects of the life were covered by a party organisation: work place, sports, culture, 
leisure ... (Maderthaner 1993). The city, respectively the party, took over the responsibility 
of delivering all relevant services to the population, especially the popular classes. 
Especially after 1927, social democracy was isolated at the national level. Governing natio-
nally became a very remote option. Vienna became increasingly isolated and the conservative 
government started a deliberate strategy of centralisation. Its core was the so called "fiscal 
march at Vienna". The conservative strategy was successful and together with the severe 
economic crisis after 1929 "Red Vienna" had to come back on some of its reforms already 
before the oficial take-over of the city administration by conservative forces after civil war 
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in 1934. 
2.3. German Fascism (1938 - 1945) 
At the beginning of 1938, the austrofascist regime's social base was eroded. Austria's 
international position was one of isolation, enabling fascist Germany to occupy the country 
easily. This was the first step towards German territorial expansion. The alliance between the 
German NS-government and industrialists aimed at overcoming the structural crisis of the 
extensive regime of accumulation by a territorially expansionist strategy which would provide 
German capital with cheap natural resources and a ready market. Politically, Austria was 
integrated into the German state. Economically, it was at once integrated into German war 
industry. The German war planners established new heavy industries in Austria, esp. in 
Upper Austria. Thus, Austria's industrial structure was significantly altered, geographically 
diversified, and increasingly orientated towards the west. The Austrian working class was 
significantly enlarged (though forced labour played an extremely important role in the 
establishment and running of war-related industries; cf. Mulley, 1988, Kernbauer and Weber 
1988, Moser 1996). 
The NS regime created in 1939 Greater Vienna, the "by area largest city of the German 
Reich" by integrating earlier independent municipalities into the city (Schubert 1985: 458). 
This only served to hide the real objective of downgrading this politically "dangerous" 
and "multi-culturally oriented" city. Jewish company owners were expropriated, the large 
number of small Jewish traders and artisans driven out of business. Vienna was to be the 
experimental field of arisation linked with rationalisation (Aly and Heim 1993). Those 
outstanding intellectuals which after four years of austrofascist dictatorship had not left the 
country were purged by the NS regime. 200,000 of Viennese citizens were either deported 
to concentration camps and killed or bad to flee the country (Fa8mann 1995: 14). Very few 
intellectuals returned to Vienna after the war, although an astonishingly large number of 
famous thinkers was born in Vienna. 
3. Successful nation building (1945 - ea. 1986) 
3.1. Supply-side Fordism 
With the immediate post-war years, the social balance of forces and the direction of policies 
changed decisively in Western Europe (already a bit earlier in the USA). In marked contrast 
to 1918, even large parts of capital understood that reforms were unavoidable. The Soviet 
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Union and Communist Parties had won much prestige. Under the new circumstances, capital 
was more amendable to compromise with the labour movement. The new compromise 
included a considerably enhanced social security system, new patterns of labour relations 
based on collective bargaining and an active demand management. This enabled the ab-
sorption of the petty commodity production, e.g. agriculture, into the thouroughly capitalist 
sector which entailed an enlargement of the domestic market. Market enlargement was 
conducive to a rapid growth in labour productivity. In many countries, real wages increased 
in line with labour productivity. Thus, a virtuous cycle linking mass production and mass 
demand was established. Capital goods and consumer goods industries were much more 
closely interlinked. The extensive was turned into an intensive regime of accumulation. 
This transformation critically hinged on the low level of the internationalisation of economic 
relations, esp. the low ebb and tight control of capital movements. Capital was not able to 
by-pass the national political compromise. National demand management was highly effecti-
ve. International trade, however, was increasingly liberalised in a stable multilateral frame-
work and increased rapidly. 
The geographical pattern of trade changed significantly. Corporations embarked on strategies 
of monopolistic competition targeting markets in other industrial countries which were 
significantly enlarged in the framework of fordism. Foreign direct investment followed a 
similar pattern (Roth 1984). Flows of financial capital were, however, strictly controlled until 
the 1960s. In Western Europe, regional economic integration based on intra-regional trade 
and capital flows and political integration proved to be mutually reinforcing (Becker 1996b ). 
In contrast to the inter-war years, fordism was a "golden age" (Marglin and Schor 1990) of 
Austrian capitalism. Real per capita GDP grew by 4.9% per year from 1950 to 1973 compa-
red with a West European average of 3.8% (and growth rates in the successor states varying 
from 3.1 % in CSSR to 4.4.% in Yugoslavia (Maddison 1995: 62, Tab. 3-2). 
The Austrian version of fordism had its own peculiarities. Like post-fascist fordisms of Italy 
and Germany, Austrian fordism was initially built on supply-side policies, cheap and docile 
labour, and exports to other Western countries enlarging their domestic markets (Salvati 
1984, Abelshauser 1983, Altvater et al. 1979, Hwaletz 1996). From 1947/48 onwards, the 
Austrian government embarked on the development of the heavy industries mainly located 
in Upper Austria which had been inherited from German fascism and were nationalised after 
the war (Moser 1996). Their development was backed up by ERP funds. Differences within 
the coalition of socialdemocrats and conservatives prevented, however, the full-scale ex-
ploitation of this option since the conservatives succesfully pushed for a ban on the branching 
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out of nationalised industries into the production of final goods. Thus, nationalised industries 
fulfilled basically a supplier function for final goods industries in the 1950s and 1960s. It 
was only in the 1970s that a socialdemocratic government was able to use the nationalised 
industries as a major vehicle of technological development (Scherb and Morawetz n.d.). 
Based on comparatively cheap and docile labour, Austrian industries specialised increasingly 
in the provision of a changing range of cheap inputs to fordist industries in other West 
European states, esp. Germany. From the 1970s, foreign direct investment in Austria focused 
mainly on supplier industries. The export quota (merchandise exports/GDP) increased from 
12.6% in 1950 to 19.0% in 1973 and eventually to 23.2% in 1987 (Maddison 1991: 326 
Tab.F.7). There was another decisive link to the new fordist demand in Western Europe -
mass tourism (Hwaletz 1996). 
In spite of restrictive wage policies, real wages increased - from the 1960s basically in line 
with the labour productivity. From 1960 to 1990, the average annual growth rate of real 
wages amounted to 3.1 per cent compared to an annual growth rate of labour productivity 
(defined as GDP/employee) of 3.3 per cent (Guger 1993: 231, Tab. 1, cf. also Marterbauer 
1991). Petty commodity production was increasingly absorbed by the capitalist sector 
(Hlawetz 1996: 110). Thus, domestic mass demand arose as did industries geared towards 
this demand. Nevertheless, consumer industries remained dominated by small-scale and 
medium-scale enterprises and compared with other Western European countries were rather 
traditional in outlook (Aiginger 1989). 
State policies sustained demand. Regional policies were aimed at reducing regional inequali-
ties. Due to the heritage of German fascism and post-war policies which in a cold war 
context aimed at strengthening the industries in the Western occupation zone (esp. Upper 
Austria) to the detriment of the Soviet occupation zone in the East there was a durable 
westward relocation of Austrian industry (Moser 1996). The Austrian government pursued, 
however, a cautious approach to Western European integration favouring EFIA over EEC 
until the 1980s. 
The post-war dispensation rested on a new social alliance between (productive) capital, 
middle strata and organised labour. This alliance had its organisational expression in the 
formation of broadly based coalition governments and the establishment of neo-corporatist 
institutions which made Austria a model of neo-corporatism (cf. e.g. Gerlich et al. 1985, 
Talos 1993). In the neo-corporatist framework, decision-making was highly centralised and 
top-down. This organisational set-up was highly functional in finding comprehensive corn-
14 
promises covering various fields of economic policies. Political stability resulting from 
neo-corporatism and high growth facilitating the accomodation of disparate social interests 
proved mutually reinforcing. In the context of high economic growth and political stability, 
the Austrian nation state finally won a high degree of legitimacy (cf. Hanisch 1994) 
In spite of regional homogenisation and the centralised neo-corporatist system, the Lander 
were from the mid-1970s onwards able to slightly reinforce their political authority which 
was quite untypical for fordism (Pernthaler 1988). This might be explained by the desire of 
the conservative Austrian People's Party (OVP) to enhance ist political position. OVP was 
strong in most of the Lander, but declining in force at national level. The policies of the 
Lander were, however, much more homogeneous than in the inter-war period. 
3.2. Vienna as the national centre of a nationally oriented economy 
Vienna lost even more of its centre status in the fields of finance and industry. In the 
immediate post-war years, the policies of the Austrian government and the Western occupa-
tion powers effected a displacement of the industrial centre of gravity to the West of the 
country. The westward move of the economic dynamics initiated by fascism was to the 
detriment of Vienna. With state-owned firms located in the West Viennese industry concen-
trated on the national market. After World War II this was, contrary to the inter-war years, 
a strategy chosen by national actors given the realities of the cold war. Vienna, near to the 
Iron Curtain, was cut off from its hinterland. Bratislava, the Slovakian capital with some 
500.000 inhabitants, is only 60 km away from Vienna. The agglomeration advantages 
remained unused due to the political setting of the cold war. 
In the 60s firm strategies and regional policy measures incentivated industrial decentralisa-
tion. 1960-1966 plants were set up around the core area of Vienna, but latter also in the 
peripheral parts of Lower Austria (Todtling 1984: 406). This resulted in employment disper-
sion, not, however, in a decentralisation of control. Within the national boundaries, there was 
a high degree of spatial concentration of economic control. In 1973, headquarters in Vienna 
controlled 43% of all jobs in Austrian industrial branch plants. In the manufacturing sector 
Vienna controlled almost three-quarters of jobs in Austrian branch plants (Todtling 1984: 
404). Comparing data from 1973 with those from the 1981 census shows that the fordist 
pattern of center-peripheral within a national economy began to dissolve. Vienna' s position 
as a center of organisational control deteriorated in 1981 to the advantage of smaller national 
agglomerations. Whereas Vienna controlled 232.000 jobs in Austrian branch plants (71 % of 
all externally controlled emploment), in 1981 it controlled 35.000 jobs less and its share fell 
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to 58% (Maier and Tootling 1986: 1218). Within the Vienna economy, there could be 
observed the takeover of endogenous plants versus multinational firms. 
Politically, after World War II. socialdemocracy again took over local government. But the 
rupture of the war was severe. Most of the intellectuals that had sustained innovative urban 
policies did not return. The cultural and intellectual climate of the inter-war years, not to 
speak of Fin-de-Siecle-Vienna, was definitively destroyed. The costs of this tremendous loss 
could be hidden for decades. Growth made the delivery of social services at the local level -
housing, education, health - possible. This was the main function of the local state. The 
relationship to civil society changed, too. Whereas during the inter-war-period, it was the 
party organisation that was the key institution of civil society and guaranteed the transmission 
of the popular will to the political system (urban politics), in the post-war period, due to the 
Great Coalition a rapid process of depolitisation was observed. The party was depoliticised 
and turned into a vehicle of clientelism. The socialdemocratic local governemt and its city 
bureaucracy directly satisfied the material needs of the population. Concerning other parts of 
civil society, socialdemocracy pursued a successful strategy of cooptation; civil society was 
"etatisised". The administration gave financial support to potentially oppositional forces, by 
this avoiding an open opposition of critical civil society. 
But political strategies were no longer elaborated at the local level. Vienna was no exception 
to this rule. Now it was at the national level that keynesian policies were implemented, first 
by predominantly conservative-led great coalitions and from 1970 onwards by a socialdemo-
cratic government. Local policies followed the national pattern. In Vienna, too, socialdemo-
cracy, although receiving well above 50% of the votes, agreed on entering in a great coalition 
at the local level. This consensus-oriented politics secured social peace, but undermined 
social innovation and creativity. Local post-war economic policy consisted in two parallel 
strategies: First, the local chamber of commerce protected the local economy by severe 
bureaucratic hindrances for newcomers. Second, the socialdemocratic finance secretary tried 
to attract big foreign investors, like BMW. 
With regard to Vienna's international status as a political centre, the national and local 
governments were able to capitalise on Austria's status as a neutral power in the cold war 
context. They were able to convince several important international organisations, like the 
UNO, OSCE, OPEC, to choose Vienna as an administrative centre. 
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4. Globalisation, regionalisation and decentralisation (from 1986 onwards) 
4.1. Crisis of overaccumulation and neoliberalism 
In the late 1960s, early 1970s, the "golden age" of post-war capitalism came to an end. The 
petty commodity production bad largely been absorbed by capitalism. Demand for durable 
consumer goods showed symptoms of saturation. The productivity reserves of fordist labour 
organisation had almost been exhausted, growth of labour productivity slowed down conside-
rably. Full employment had strengthened the labour movement. Capital came to fear a 
permanent swing to the left in the wake of large-scale labour strikes and students demon-
strations in the late 1960s. 
Capital reacted in several ways to the changing circumstances, rationalising and reorganising 
production and administration. In the wake of these reorganisations, the labour force has 
become more differentiated - entailing a weakening of the unions - and production has 
tendentially been flexibilised. It seems, however, premature to talk about the establishment 
of a new model of production (cf. Durand 1993). 
Corporations inreasingly internationalised their production. New communication technologies 
proved to be a major support to these internationalisation strategies. In case of flexibilised 
just-in-time production, corporations often sought to locate cheap production facilities close 
to their main locations within the poles of the triade (Chesnais 1994: 106). Since the mid--
1980s, FDI in services (esp. in banking, insurance, and telecommunications) has increased 
significantly as well. Both FDI and international trade showed a marked trend towards 
intra-regional concentration (Chesnais 1994: 188, 197). The most notable trend has been, 
however, the shift from productive to financial investment which could already be observed 
in the past as indication of the exhaustion of the mode of development (cf. Arrighi 1994). 
The rapidly expanding financial markets became increasingly global in character since the 
new communication technologies enhanced the international mobility of financial capital and 
since the financial intermediaries had successfully pushed for a liberalisation of capital flows 
and deregulation of the financial markets. 
Through internationalisation, national governments' room for manoeuvre was reduced. The 
social and political balance of forces shifted to the right. Trade unions were weakened. The 
increasing number of unemployed and the non-core labour force was socially and politically 
marginalised. Capital pushed through new patterns of regulation. National policies have 
become mixtures of measures aiming at attracting highly volatile financial capital and 
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targetting at an increase rn international competetiveness in the production sphere. The 
measures propulsed by different social blocs centred around frnancial intermediaries and 
productive capital respectively, were however partially contradictory. For example, high 
interest rates were instrumental to attracting financial capital, but proved to be an obstacle to 
productive investment. The strategies converged, however, in the attempts to cut wages and 
to dismantle the welfare state (cf. Becker 1996a). 
The logic of regional integration shifted in the same way (Becker 1996b ). Changes in the 
Austrian regime of accumulation and mode of regulation came about with a considerable 
time-lag and in a hesitant way. Until 1983 (and less pronounced until 1986), the socialdemo-
cratic government attempted to preserve central traits of the fordist regime of accumulation 
while adapting to the new situation. In an "austro-keynesian" conception, the government 
aimed at both increasing international competitiveness and stabilising domestic demand. By 
maintaining a high exchange rate and eventually linking the Austrian Shilling to the DM, the 
government put pressure on the companies to increase productivity and provided a stable 
framework of currency policy for doing business with the core of the EEC. The trade unions 
accepted restrictive wage policies. They were rewarded with rather expansionary budget 
policies which stabilised demand. Protected sectors of the economy served as shock absorbers 
(cf. e.g. Neck 1990, Weber and Venus 1993). Trade and investment linkages with Germany 
continued to grow, the Austrian industrial subsidiaries often serving as suppliers to German 
industries (Morawetz 1990). The high degree of wage differentiation with very low wages in 
some consumer goods industries enabled low-tech "traditional" consumer goods industries 
(e.g. textiles, shoes) to survive (Aiginger 1989, Guger 1993: 234-237). Parastatals were 
modernised. Compared to other Western countries, but in line with German developments, 
the Austrian financial sector remained rather controlled, and, therefore, banking business was 
more restrained (cf. Aglietta 1993, Hwaletz 1996: 121 et seq. 135-140). Nevertheless, inter-
national activity of Austrian banks increased significantly between 1976 and 1984 (Oesterrei-
chische Nationalbank 1995a: 83). The Austrian mode of development in the 1970s and early 
1980s was characterised by a rather strong continuity of the "golden age". 
Compared to other OECD countries, macroeconomic performance was good. Real GDP per 
capita grew by 3.0% p.a. from 1973-79 and by 1.9% from 1979-89 compared to an EU15 
average of 2.2% and 2.0% respectively (OECD 1995: 50, Tab. 3.2). Unemployment was 
considerably lower than in most Western countries (OStZ 1993: 477, Tab. 6.06). 
Since 1986, the Austrian governments have followed a more unequivocally extraverted 
economic policy. International developments played a major role in this policy change. In the 
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face of high international interest rates, it became increasingly difficult to sustain an expan-
sionary fiscal policy which had been a major plank of austro-keynesianism (cf. generally 
Fitoussi 1995). The EEC entered a new phase with the proposed Single Market project which 
was to make European industry more competitive internationally. Since the Austrian economy 
was extremely orientated to the EEC, this programme was to have serious repercussions on 
Austria (Karlhofer and Talos 1996: 50 et seq.). 
"The "opening" of Eastern Europe in 1989 brought about one of the strongest shocks caused 
by the external environment for Austria since WWII. New chances and threats emerged and 
paralleld Austria's West European integration process, thus putting heavy restructuring 
pressure on Austrian firms", as Bellak concludes (1995: 25). These international develop-
ments did not only exert economic restructuring pressure on Austrian firms, but politically 
strengthened business interests which demanded lower wage costs in order to increase 
profitability and desired to open up new fields to private capital. The government reacted by 
switching to a much more conservative fiscal policy (tax reform plus more cautious deficit 
spending), launching a more vigorous privatisation policy, liberalising the banking sector and 
capital flows, and applying for EEC membership. These measures boilt down to a more 
outward looking strategy downgrading the domestic market which came close to the strategy 
of competetive deflation en vogue in Western Europe. Some of the measures adopted were 
in line with the interests of financial capital investors. The two decisive social forces of the 
new dispensation are business (esp. export oriented fractions and financial intermediaries) and 
upper middle strata. 
Austrian capital banked more on extraversion. Since 1988, there has been a major surge of 
Austrian FDI which had been insignificant before. Austrian FDI stock abroad increased from 
ATS 20 bn in 1988 to ATS 111 bn in 1994 (estimate, Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1995b: 
112 et seq., Tab. 10.2.0). Towards the mid-1990s, this surge of FDI slowed down with FDI 
flows halving between 1992 and 1995 (Stankovsky 1996: 353). In anticipation of the EU 
Single Market and a possible Austrian entry into EU, most FDI was located in Western 
Europe though the relative share of Germany in the FDI capital stock was declining from 
27.8% in 1985 to 16.0% in 1993 (nominal capital, Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1995c: 10, 
Tab. 2.1, Bellak 1995: 25). Austrian companies responded quickly to the opening up of new 
opportunities in Eastern Europe, thus, 20.2% of FDI stock (nominal capital) was located in 
Hungary in 1993 (Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1995c: 10, Tab. 2.1). Since 1992/93, the 
Austrian corporations have, however, lost market shares in FDI in Eastern Europe to other 
OECD countries (Stankovsky 1996) what is not surprising since Austrian companies respon-
ded exceptionally quickly to changes in Eastern Europe and the predominance of SMEs is an 
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impediment to large scale FDI. Austrian FDI was concentrated in a few sectors (banking 
18%, oil & chemical industry 12.8%, metal goods sector 9.2% in 1993, Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank 1995c: 48, Tab. 19.la). 
Growth of FDI in Austria was not that spectacular with stocks increasing from ATS 89 bn 
in 1988 to ATS 152 bn in 1994 (Oesterrreichische Nationalbank 1995b: 112 et seq .• Tab. 
10.2.0) which continued to originate dominantly from German corporations (35.4% in 1985, 
37.8% in 1993, nominal capital, Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1995c: 11, Tab. 2.2). In an 
attempt to increase international competitiveness and profits, Austrian business embarked on 
a labour cost cutting exercise. This took the form of job cuts and a restrictive wage policy 
to which the trade unions acquiesced (Hwaletz 1996: 190-193, Guger 1993: 232-234). 
Cost-cutting exercises and increased internationalisation of productive capital did not 
translate into an increased export quota as far as merchandise exports are concerned, actually 
this quota declined slightly from 26.3.% in 1985 to 22.8% in 1994 (own calculations based 
on Oesterreichische Nationalbank 1995b: 88, Tab. 9.0 & 94 et seq., Tab. 10.0.0). Even, if the 
service exports are included, there was not a stable increase of the export quota. Though the 
enlarged export quota rose from 35.6 per cent in 1987 to 40.2 per cent in 1990, it slided back 
to 37.9 per cent in 1993(OECD 1995: 75. Tab. 6.12). 
The restructuring entailed a steep decline of a number of traditional consumer goods indu-
stries (esp. food, clothing, textiles, leather goods, OStZ 1996: 13, Tab. 8.2, Leitner and 
Henkel 1996, Lamel 1996, Smolka 1996). In agriculture. the main restructuring still has to 
come. The weight of some. but not all basic industries was accentuated. The high tech-sector 
continued to be rather little developed, providing only 6.8% of exports in 1991 compared 
with an OECD average of 15.9% (Pointner and Schneider 1994: 49, Tab. 4). The privatisa-
tion of hitherto state-owned industries might even weaken the technological capacity since 
these companies are likely to be turned into subsidiaries of foreign corporations which have 
located their technological centres elsewhere. Austria's entry into European Economic Area 
(EEA) in 1994 and into EU in 1995 implies a lasting reordering of political regulation 
amongst the different territorial levels and cementing the political reorientation begun in 
1986. In fact, the two issues go together. Important political competences have been shifted 
to the supranational level. Though labour relations, social security and environmental policies 
remain basically a prerogative of nation states, national policies in these fields are put under 
pressure of downward adjustment by the Single Market (cf. Becker 1996a. Streeck 1995). 
These pressures are heightened by the Maastricht criteria which have already entailed a 
pruning down of the welfare state. And this seems to be actually one the main targets of 
these criteria. With unusual frankness, Giulio Tremonti, a leading intellectual and former 
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minister of Forza Italia, told reporters of the conservative Italian daily Corriere della Sera 
(18.5.1996: 5) that Maastricht was about introducing the Euro and "dismantling the old style 
welfare state" which did meet a lot of resistance at the national level. The shift in the level 
of regulation to EU entails a shift in the social and political balance of forces. Trade unions 
and "new" social movements are less able to organise and act at the supranational level than 
are business associations. The channels of access at EU level are structured in an unfavoura-
ble way to trade unions and "new" social movements since executive structures are extremely 
powerful compared to parliamentary structures which had been quite important to trade 
unions in winning concessions at the national level in the past. 
In many West European states, the nation state has not only lost competences to the suprana-
tional level, but also to the rnicroregional level. It is still too early to tell whether the same 
will happen in Austria though the creeping dehomogenisation makes this seem to be likely. 
An enhanced rnicroregional autonomy would, however, have to contend with considerable 
fiscal constraints. Though Austrian neocorporatist structures have organisationally adapted to 
EU membership (Karlhofer and Talos 1996), there is, however, not yet a clear trend towards 
micro-corporatism as it can be observed in many other European countries (cf. generally 
Regini 1991, on Austria Traxler 1993 ). The role of Austrian neocorporatist institutions is 
being redefined as to give absolute priority to enhancing international competitiveness. The 
likely consequence is that increasingly only the interests of the core workforce being central 
to export production will be taken into acccount. Thus, neocorporatism would become less 
encompassing. The political exchange is already now becoming more detrimental to labour. 
4.2. Continuing decline, neoliberalism or ecosocial reformism in Vienna? 
Compared to other european cities, Vienna's growth rate of 2.2% p.a. from 1975 to 1993 is 
above average. For the period 1989-1993 Vienna achieves with an average annual growth 
rate of 2.6% the europe-wide fifth highest ranking (Mayerhofer and Palme, 1996: 34). 
Unfortunately, this quantitative increases are mainly due to the strong performance of 
construction industry and the public sector, sectors that will come under increasing pressure 
in the near future. 
As far as employment is concerned, from 1971 to 1991 the relative performance of Vienna 
was weak. Whereas the nationwide increase in jobs was 14.06% during 1971/1981 and 10.2% 
during 1981/1991 the respective increases in Vienna were 3.84% and 5.5%. Parts of this 
meager dynamics is explained by the strong job increases in districts in Greater Vienna 
(Mesch 1989: 371; Reiterlechner and Schmee, 1995: 34). 
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From 1971 to 1991 employment in industry declined from 28.4% to 20.1 %; whereas the 
share of services increased from 70.6% to 78.8%. That means that in industry 111.500 jobs 
were lost in the last two decades (Mayerhofer and Palme 1996: 38f). Vienna's share in 
industrial gross production declined to 18.8 per cent in 1988, its share in industrial em-
ployment was 18.9 per cent in 1988 (OStZ 1993: 275, Tab. 21.09). 
Foreign industrial corporations have continued to show a stronger preference for Vienna as 
their location. In 1985, 47 per cent of industrial FDI (nominal capital) was located in Vienna 
(Glatz and Moser 1989: 83). Industrial FDI in Vienna was less geared towards the West 
European market and more geared towards the domestic market than in other Austrian 
regions (Glatz and Moser 1989: 133). Services remained quite concentrated in Vienna, esp. 
financial services (OStZ 1993: 275, Tab. 21.09). In 1985, 66 per cent of non-industrial FDI 
(nominal capital) was located in Vienna (Glatz and Moser 1989: 83). In 1993, electrical 
engineering continues being the prime industrial activity, employing 1/3 of the Viennese 
industrial work force, followed by transportation industry with 10.7% (Mayerhofer and Palme 
1996: 66). 
At the same time, manufacturing production in the regions bordering Vienna expanded 
vigorously. The tendential de-industrialisation of the city of Vienna is due to high costs of 
labour and land. Branches that need high agglomeration advantages, however, stay in the 
city. As today energy and labour-intensive industries play a minor role in the Viennese 
industrial structure, it is less threatened by market opening of Eastern Europe. Only 6.9% of 
industrial jobs are in branches suffering from international restructuring, whereas in the 
bordering Lower Austria 46.1% might be endangered (OROK 1994: 46f.). 
The "Index of the Composition of Structural Change" for Vienna from 1961 to 1992 was the 
least pronounced of all nine Austrian "lander". The specialisation of the Viennese economy 
decreased. This is due to an increase in city tourism and a diversion of trading activities and 
increasingly also producer services to regional centers (Todtling and Traxler 1995, Mayerho-
fer and Palme 1996: 42 et seq.). Vienna has continued relying heavily on non-marketable 
services, like public administration (22.1 % ). Producer services and marketable services play -
internationally - a below average role (Mayerhofer and Palme 1996: 31). Advanced producer 
services have developed rather late in Vienna, most firms are small and most of their 
linkages are at the regional or national level. In 1976 there was a very strong national 
concentration of activities like investment consulting (45.4%), management consulting 
(42.6%), engineering (49.5%), advertising (59%), banking (40.2%) and insurance (47.8%) in 
Vienna. Until 1988 a deconcentration process of producer services can be observed in all 
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segments, being most pronounced in advertising (47,8% compared to 59%) (Todtling and 
Traxler 1995: 189). This deconcentration could not be compensated by the small increase of 
employment in producer services in the districts surrounding Vienna. What concerns high-
quality producer services Vienna has no clear competitive advantages, although it is the 
largest german-speaking university city. The linkages between university, firms and local 
government are still very weak. 
Whereas the ring around the city of Vienna had the nation-wide highest productivity in-
creases during 1981/88; Vienna's increases kept behind, independent of its high human 
capital intensity (Palme 1995). 27 .1 % of Viennese firms admitted of not having any firm-
specific competitive advantages and 64% of the products produced locally were in the 
stagnation or shrinking phase of their life cycle (OROK 1994: 24 et seq.). 
With the European integration process and the opening up of the national market, Vienna was 
more negatively affected than the rest of the country. In 1990, its export ratio (goods and 
services) of 34% is well below the Austrian average of 43.3% (OROK 1994: 24). Within a 
very short period Vienna has to meet two challenges: the opening of the Eastern borders and 
the European integration. There was established a city secretariat which is responsible for 
Viennese "foreign" affairs, esp. its relationship with the neighbouring state of Lower Austria, 
Eastern Europe and the EU. Suburban growth of Vienna is transcending its political borders, 
with negative implications for the local budget and severe pressure on local infrastructure 
(esp. transport and health). Establishing closer links with Bratislava and Brno might dynarnise 
the development of Vienna (Altzinger and Maier 1996). 
Politically, socialdemocracy tried to prolong fordist regulation at the local level. Whereas 
national keynesian policies came to an end in 1986, Vienna was for a decade able to avoid 
any ruptures. Conventional strategies of protecting small enterprises by burocratic mecha-
nisms and attracting large investors increasingly lost viability. The response of local go-
vernment was the autonomisation of parts of public administration. On the one hand, new 
planning bodies were created for specific projects and objectives, thus being able to response 
quickly and flexibly to investors. These bodies are no longer under direct parliamentary 
control (Mayerhofer 1994: 44 et seq.). On the other hand, the city continues being the main 
share holder of the largest Austrian bank, which became, due to so-called privatisations, 
owner of communal enterprises. The result is a limiting of the range of democratic political 
decision-making. 
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In social policy, too, signals of an urban crisis could no longer be neglected. Although the 
city invested heavily in housing construction and a considerable amount of new housing was 
constructed in the transdanubian suburbs, local government had increasing difficulties in 
delivering social services. The clientelist relationship with civil society became increasingly 
threatened for the same reason: lack of funds to deliver the material rewards for social move-
ments and the voluntary sector. Receipts from local taxes, which are still characterised by its 
regressive structure, stagnate. Transfers from the national government did not increase, either 
(Imhof 1996). Nevertheless local government was able to increase its income in the 90s due 
to increased fees charged for infrastructure provision, like water, sewage and gas. Expenditu-
res increased even quicker, causing budgetary problems. 
In the 80s and until 1992, the budget remained under control, reducing the debt/GDP ratio 
from 13.37% in 1982 to 6.36% in 1992. Over the last years, however, huge new debt has 
been incurred. Whereas there was a surplus of A TS 2828 million in 1992, the budget deficit 
reached the dangerous level of ATS 14034 million in 1995 (Imhof 1996). This increase 
makes it plausible that severe adjustment measures will have to be taken by the end of the 
1990s. 
In the 1996 municipal elections socialdemocracy lost 9 of its 52 seats in local parlament, to 
the detriment of the far right (29 seats) and the new liberal party (6 seats). A stagnating 
green (7 seats) or a weakened conservative party (15 seats) are the potential coalition partners 
in an era of post-Red Vienna. 
5. Summary 
The above described development of Vienna leads to a series of empirically and theoretically 
interesting arguments. First, our approach of not limiting our historical analysis to the 
transition of fordism to post-fordism proved to be very useful. Although historical con-
clusions about the economic and political development of Vienna in the last 130 years are 
still preliminary, the present development problems can be understood much better in a larger 
historical perspective. Many of today's development problems, like globalisation and locatio-
nal competition, are not as unique as it is generally assumed out of a reduced post-World 
War II perspective. The specifics of Austrian fordism can be understood only by taking the 
strong authoritarian tradition - monarchy and fascism - into account. The very successful 
model of supply-side fordism poses severe problems to adapt to globalisation and flexible 
production. There is a lack of historical experiences of self-organised and participative 
institutional settings at the work place and in politics. 
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Second, our geographical approach of not limiting ourselves to analysing the national level 
helped producing interesting results. There could not be observed a linear link between the 
accumulation strategies of the different forces of capital with direct consequences on the 
economic space and the centralisation and decentralisation of political decision making. The 
political cannot be derived directly from the economic though the two spheres are articulated 
with each other. The locus of political decision making is an object of political struggles to 
push through specific socio-economic changes. Social actors might privilege certain territorial 
arrangements of state regulation and certain territorial levels of the state over others because 
these are more favourable organisational fields for pushing through their socio-economic 
programme. 
For example, the Austrian labour movement de facto privileged the Viennese local go-
vernment to push through at least parts of their agenda in the inter-war years in the process 
of defending local fiscal autonomy. In the 1980s. capital privileged the transfer of political 
authority to a supranational body to push through its neoliberal agenda. It is not a pure 
coincidence that both attempts at a (at least incipient) reordering of the territorial levels of 
political regulation occured in periods of structural crisis. In times of structural crisis, 
historical situations seem to be more open (Fiori 1995). In times of comparatively stable 
modes of development, historical situations seem to be much more fixed, the range of options 
to be much smaller. Past experience seems to indicate that political decentralisation and 
margins for manoeuvre of the local state seem to be highest in cases of a high degree of 
centralisation of finance capital and extraverted accumulation strategies resulting in extraver-
ted regimes of accumulation going hand in hand with a high degree of regional heterogenity. 
In the case of more inward-looking strategies, a higher degree of centralisation within the 
nation state seems likely. 
If these conclusions were correct, it would seem that today a potentially broad margin for 
manoeuvre would exist for the Viennese local government. It is, however, doubtful whether 
this space will be exploited. In the 1920s, it was a Viennese local government representing 
different social interests with a distinct socio-economic programme from the national go-
vernment that was capable of launching the social experiments of "Red Vienna". Today's 
local government of Vienna represents basically the same social interests as the national 
government though pursuing somewhat more integrative policies. It seems likely that the 
present mode of regulation with a strong fordist imprint will become increasingly inviable -
not the least because of fiscal constraints. 
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Then Vienna will have to choose between abandoning its commitment to a local welfare state 
(which is increasingly unaffordable under the dominant institutional setting) or changing the 
institutional setting. The former would imply the dominant neoliberal option of urban 
entrepreneurialism. Given the present balance of power, it seems most likely that socialdemo-
cracy itself - supported by an extremely weak conservative party - will initiate a gradual 
demise of the local welfare state with the more right wing parties FPO and LIF advocating 
more drastic policies. This would be no surprise observing national development in the last 
ten years. It would be in line with developments in other cities, subordinating politics to the 
imperative of locational competition. The result would be social and spatial polarisation to 
an extent until now unknown in Vienna. 
The latter option of restructuring the welfare state seems in the short run remote, although 
being the only progressive solution in the long run. Its main actors have to be found not only 
in the political system, but in social movements and an innovative voluntary sector which 
have been neglected for decades in political decision making. Within the political system it 
presupposes a socialdemocracy that agrees on power-sharing with the Greens - and prgressive 
sectors of civil society - aiming at inclusive strategies of integrating marginalised interests 
(Mayer 1995). But Red-Green coalitions in itself do not necessarily stand for this second 
option, as has been shown for Frankfurt (Hitz et al. 1995). Active pressures of social move-
ments would be absolutely essential. Ecosocial reformism would imply an open policy of 
distribution of income and wealth within the city based on politicising local budgeting, i.e. 
democratising the decision making on infrastructure provision and a progressive taxation of 
resources, esp. land. Furthermore, in contrast to the "Red Vienna" -strategy today an explicit 
local economic strategy would be necessary. Local politics would have to build on the 
agglomeration advantages of a large city: it would have to prioritise industries and services 
that need skilled labour and produce ecologically sustainable products. 
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